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An Application of Contest Success Functions for Draws on European 
Soccer 
A contest success function (success function) maps the level of efforts into winning and 
losing probabilities in contest theory. We aim to assess the empirical performance of 
success functions for draws and analyse the differences between European soccer 
leagues in terms of home-bias, return on talent, and talent inequality. We use a dataset 
with 10569 matches acquired manually from transfermarkt.co.uk containing club based 
average market values of the line-up of teams for each match played through twelve 
seasons from seven major European soccer leagues. The results are obtained estimating 
the parameters of the success functions with a general maximum-likelihood method 
and the hypotheses suggested by success functions are controlled with a probit 
regression. Two of the success functions outperform one conclusively. The difference 
in the performance between these two groups results from the contrast in the main 
determinant of the success function in allocating the probability of a draw. The high 
performing success functions take difference in aggregate talent levels as the main 
determinant in drawing while the other takes the aggregate talent as the main 
determinant. The results also show that there are major differences across leagues in 
terms of return on talent, home-bias, and talent inequality despite the similarities in 
economic environment and the homogeneity in the rules of the game imposed across 
leagues. Our analysis sheds light on the contributions and implications of 
microeconomic theory to model sports and presents the differing characteristics of the 
European soccer leagues that impact match results significantly. 
Keywords: Contest success function, draw, home-bias, European soccer leagues.   
Subject classification codes: C51, D72, L83 
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Introduction 
A Contest Success Function (success function for short, hereinafter) is a mathematical tool 
used in contest theory to determine the winning probabilities of each contender in a contest in 
terms of individual and aggregate effort/investment exerted. Its intuitive structure and 
convenient use has given rise to its use in various economic settings that possess an implicit 
or explicit contest structure. These applications include major fields in economics, business, 
and political science such as rent-seeking (Nitzan, 1991 and 1994), military conflicts 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Corchón and Beviá, 2010), marketing (Schmalensee, 1976; 
Haan and Moraga-González, 2011), litigation (Robson and Skaperdas, 2008), and sports 
(Szymanski, 2003 and Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004).  
Unlike all-pay auctions in which the highest investment/bid wins with certainty (see 
for example Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996)), the contests mentioned above have an 
element of uncertainty. By capturing this uncertainty, success functions provide a theoretical 
tool to form expectations on the equilibrium outcome of and effort/investment in a contest. 
Broadly speaking, success functions had been constructed and have been used to 
admit only two possible results for a contender, i.e. ‘win’ or ‘lose’. The most prominent of 
these are the ratio form of Tullock (1980) and the logit form of Hirshleifer (1989). The game 
theoretical expectations on aggregate efforts, outcomes, and rents dissipated when one studies 
success functions that only allow two possibilities are well studied and appreciated in the 
literature.
1
 Recently, there has also been some effort to justify and compare success functions 
empirically; Hwang (2009) uses military data, Jia (2008) and Peeters (2010) use data from 
sports with this intention in mind. Experimental justification of the success functions also has 
                                                 
1
 A survey of the vast theoretical literature on contest theory may be found in Corchón (2007) and 
Konrad (2009). 
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been a matter of interest in the literature as exemplified by Millner and Pratt (1989), and 
Fonseca (2009).  
Despite this widespread assumption and use, a third possible outcome exists in 
various contests: a draw. One can instantly enlist sports, military conflicts, rent-seeking, and 
promotional contests among those. In sports competitions such as soccer
2
, which is also the 
main interest of this paper, chess, and cricket, a draw possibility is enforced by the design of 
the game. For military conflicts Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Blavatskyy (2010) argue 
that it is natural to anticipate contenders to end up in the same bargaining position they had 
before a military conflict. In rent-seeking, the lack of credibility of the authority gives rise to 
the possibility of a draw as studied by Kahana and Nitzan (1999). Finally, in promotional 
contests the recruiting body is entitled by law to deny the employment to all participants if it 
fails to encounter a fitting candidate. 
Draws carry a particular importance in soccer. In a league championship fixture, a 
draw implies equal (one) point for both clubs and the point allocated in its occurrence makes 
it strictly better than losing the match which allocates zero points. Moreover, mostly because 
of the scoring system in and the nature of soccer, a draw is a highly probable outcome of a 
game; approximately 25%-30% of the matches played in professional soccer leagues end in a 
draw
3
. These properties of draws in soccer make them an important element to be reckoned 
with, and many coaches and managers contrive their field strategies accommodating or 
avoiding a draw depending on the strength of the contender.  
There are currently three classes of success functions studied in contest theory that 
admit a possibility for a draw. The earliest one of those is by Blavatskyy (2010), who also 
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 Soccer is used to signify the US equivalent of the word football (or association football) in Europe. 
3
 See Table 1. 
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provides a microeconomic foundation for this success function
4
. This model implies that the 
probability of a draw gets infinitesimal as aggregate efforts/investments of the contestants 
grow. Blavatskyy (2010) argues that a draw should seldom be expected when both 
contenders exert high effort. However, there are contests for which this conjecture may not 
hold. Sports is an obvious contest environment where differences between teams is 
canonically thought to be more pertinent in draws. For instance, Peeters and Szymanski 
(2012) argue that Blavatskyy’s success function may not be appropriate for sports.  
Especially for soccer, it is intuitive to expect two teams to draw with a relatively high 
probability when they have similar investment/talent
5
 on the field, regardless of the 
magnitude of the aggregate level of investment/talent. The second class of success functions 
that admits a possibility of a draw is stochastically axiomatized by Jia (2012). According to 
this model, the probability of a draw is a function of the squared difference in efforts and 
depends on a ‘coarseness-parameter’ that serves as a threshold against which the difference is 
checked. The most recent axiomatization and analysis of a success function with draws is by 
Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) in which the propensity of drawing in a contest is 
captured by a ‘draw-inclination’ parameter that determines the degree of the polynomial of 
effort difference. In this paper, the manner in which a draw is handled axiomatically and 
game theoretical expectations on aggregate effort and rent dissipation diverge profoundly 
from those in Blavatskyy (2010) and Jia (2012). Particularly for soccer, this model forecasts 
an adverse impact on investment/talent or aggregate squad effort for large draw points in 
games with heterogeneously resourceful teams. Moreover, it also implies that aggregate 
                                                 
4
 This form is stochastically axiomatized by Jia (2012). 
5
 We use (aggregate) investment/talent/effort interchangeably throughout this paper. We discuss this 
choice of use later in the paper.  
 
5 
effort/investment is larger compared to the fixtures where draws are not possible, even when 
the draws are equivalent to losing in terms of prize/points. The former implication of 
Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) may be a possible theoretical basis of the universal 
reduction in points allocated in case of a win from 2 points to 3 points, beginning in 1983 
with the English Premiere League. In relative terms, this change reduces the points allocated 
for a draw.       
There is a further issue for Blavatskyy’s (2010) success function that may be relevant 
in empirical matters: this form is not homogenous of degree zero, i.e. the measurement of the 
efforts such as currency, energy, time etc. matter in determining the probability of an 
outcome. On the other hand, the success functions of Jia (2012), and Vesperoni and 
Yildizparlak (2016) are both homogenous of degree zero.    
In this paper we first set out to assess the empirical performance of success functions 
for draws.
6
 For this purpose we manually build a dataset from seven major European soccer 
leagues: English Premier League, Spanish Primera División, German Bundesliga, Italian 
Serie A, French Ligue 1, Turkish Super Lig, and Russian Premier Liga. The data contains the 
‘average market value’7 of the line-up of each team, the result, and the home/away field team 
information for each match played for approximately twelve seasons. We acquired this data 
from transfermarkt.co.uk (transfermarkt for short, hereinafter) which keeps track of the 
market values of the individual professional soccer players throughout their career. By using 
                                                 
6
 For consistency we rule out other methods to capture draws used in empirical literature. For 
instance, the ‘contest function’ estimated by Peeters and Szymanski (2014) uses relative efforts 
(proxied by the wage bill paid by the club to the players) to determine the outcome of a match. 
However, this form does not constitute a success function in the theoretical sense as it does not 
define a probability function. 
7
 The definition of the average market value is provided in the next section. 
 
6 
the average market value for each match as a proxy for aggregate club talent/investment, we 
compare the empirical performance of the three success functions aforementioned: the ones 
of Blavatskyy (2010), Jia (2012), and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016). We also include a 
benchmark random choice model as a robustness check. We estimate the parameters of 
success functions, which imply a probability function each, by using a general maximum-
likelihood  procedure, and compare the goodness-of-fit of each success function with the test 
of Vuong (1989) for non-nested maximum-likelihood models.
8
  
Our results favor the success functions of Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak 
(2016), implying that the success functions that use relative differences in investment/talent 
as the major determinant for a draw (instead of aggregate investment/talent) are more 
relevant for soccer. Moreover, all the success functions used fare better than the benchmark 
model which suggests that the investments matter in the outcome. The results obtained from 
our maximum-likelihood procedure is also confirmed in the probit estimation for which we 
regroup the data into a binary variable of outcome as ‘draw’ and ‘no-draw’, and use 
aggregate talent and difference in talent per match as regressors.  
Last, we compare some key features of the soccer matches that have major impact on 
results across European leagues:  the return on talent, home-bias and talent inequality. The 
former two are designated and estimated by the maximum-likelihood procedure as 
parameters of success functions, and we build a conjecture on the latter from the data and 
summary statistics. Briefly, we find that European soccer leagues have widely different 
characteristics in return on talent and home-bias even though they operate on essentially 
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 To our knowledge, this method is first used by Peeters (2010) in order to compare the performance 
of Tullock’s (1980) and Hirshleifer’s (1989) success functions that allow only a single outcome 
for a match, i.e. some contestant wins with probability 1. 
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identical rules. These results were also established before by Pollard G. and Pollard R. 
(2005), and by Peeters and Szymanski (2014) more recently. The reasons for this effect are 
far from clear though; ranging from referee bias (Dohmen, 2008) to facility familiarity 
(Loughead et. al., 2003) and crowd size (Nevill et. al., 1996). Departing from the macro 
perspective taken in the majority of the research in home-bias
9
, i.e. using points earned at 
home-field in excess of the points earned at away-fields, by using success functions, we take 
a match-based approach in which home-bias enters in the probability function as a multiplier 
of the average market value of a team. Thus, our method may crowd out some ‘expected’ 
home wins (e.g. matches played between two teams that immensely differ in aggregate talent, 
and the team with the larger talent holds the home-field advantage) and further refine home-
bias estimations. We further find that there are major differences in terms of talent inequality 
between teams in different national leagues which may serve as a clue to explain the 
significantly different rates of draws among leagues. 
Data 
In order to compare the success functions for draws empirically we use data from the 
seven most valuable
10
 European soccer leagues as measured by aggregate market value. This 
data is manually acquired from transfermarkt and contains observations for each league 
match played from season 2004-2005 to 2012-2013.
11
 The championships included are 
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 An exception to this macro method is Peeters and Szymanski (2014) who use home-bias in 
determining thresholds for win, draw, and lose for each league based on individual fixtures.      
10
 According to transfermarkt. 
11
 Additional data is included for the league that is being considered at the time as the process is 
manual and every week a new set of matches are played. For instance, the Premier League data 
ranges to 2014-2015 first season. 
 
8 
English Premier League, Spanish Primera División, Italian Serie A, German Bundesliga, 
French Ligue 1, Turkish Super Lig, and Russian Premier Liga.  
Each observation is comprised of the ‘average market value’ of the line-up of each 
team at the day of the match
12
, the information identifying the team that plays in the home 
(away) field, and the result of the match designating the winning team or a draw. The market 
values found in transfermarkt are calculated for almost every professional soccer player 
individually starting from 2004. He (2013) reports that: 
[transfermarkt] records detailed information for major soccer players and evaluate their 
value based on data analysis, as well as opinions of experts. The values are not obtained 
by applying straightforward algorithms. Instead, factors from all aspects have to be taken 
into consideration to decide the digits of a market value. 
We use the average market value of the line-up for each match as a proxy for the 
aggregate talent or efforts of the club. The implication contest theory has on sports is that the 
talent acquired by costly investment, which translates into winning probabilities for clubs, is 
one of the main determinants of an outcome of a match. Transfermarkt places a monetary 
value for a player’s talent based on individual performance. Thus, in essence, it approximates 
aggregate talent a club possesses. Even though market values do not reflect a direct cost, they 
do represent the opportunity cost of a player to the club, i.e. if a player is over-paid (under-
paid) relative to his performance, for his current club the player is a high-cost (low-cost) 
investment. Thus, by foregoing to sell a player, the clubs bear an opportunity cost of transfer 
payments. Therefore, our interpretation of the market values represents an indirect measure 
for club investment. On the other hand, as we do not test for Nash equilibrium predictions but 
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 This is calculated by the transfermarkt and it is the average market value of the eleven players 
enlisted as playing on the day of the match.  
 
9 
the success functions themselves, the actual cost of a squad to the club does not affect our 
results. 
Our choice for proxy may seem confusing firstly, because transfermarkt uses a 
combination of opinions and data analysis of performance of the individual players as He 
(2013) reports. Additionally, in similar empirical research on soccer, the major data source is 
the payroll (wage) data as in Szymanski and Smith (1997), Hall, Szymanski, and Zimbalist 
(2002), and Peeters and Szymanski (2012 and 2014). Unfortunately, the payroll data is 
unavailable for us.  
Nevertheless, there are certain advantages we find by using average market values 
instead. Most importantly, our data offers richer dynamics because transfermarkt regularly 
(and occasionally irregularly if an important incident takes place in the career of the player) 
updates individual player market value based on player performance criteria. The market 
value of a player is also updated in the beginning of every season based on individual transfer 
market performance. Therefore, the time periods in which the market value of a player 
changes are more frequent than the one in the payroll data as the contract terms do not change 
frequently and are rather long. This feature enables us to observe a faster updating of the 
winning probabilities of the clubs whenever a squad member’s market value changes within a 
season. The rapid updating is rather important as, generally, the young and talented players in 
the beginning of their career receive lower wages and while being watched closely and 
finally transferred by major clubs receive significant increases in their wages later in their 
career. Therefore, even if their individual input to overall talent of their previous clubs is 
large, the wage they receive when they are an early career player does not translate this into 
an augmentation in winning probabilities. The opposite case is even more obvious. If a 
player’s performance decreases due to injury or other idiosyncratic reasons, the wage he 
receives stays the same until his contract ends or is terminated. Therefore, even if his wage 
 
10 
would account for a large impact in the empirical expectation of his club’s success, his real 
contribution would be much smaller or in some cases nil. We can provide recent examples of 
both cases. For the former, an example is Riyad Mahrez, who was awarded PFA Players' 
Player of the Year in the Premier League after a fruitful career in Leicester City (England). 
His market value has increased constantly from £1.06 million in January, 2014 to £25.50 
million in August, 2016 in transfermarkt. He was transferred from AC Le Havre (France) in 
the beginning of the season 2014-2015 to Leicester City for a transfer fee of only £0.425 
million while his transfer value is said to have risen to £30.1 million, which places him in the 
top 50 most valuable players in Europe (using “Leicester City”, 2016, and “Leichester City 
winger”, 2016). For the latter case a recent example is Robin van Persie, who was transferred 
from Manchester United (England) to Fenerbahce (Turkey) for a transfer fee of £4.6 million 
in the beginning of the season 2015-2016. After having a rather poor performance, often 
failing to make it to the line-up of the team due to injury or coach preference even though he 
is the highest paid member of the squad, his market value has declined from £12.75 million 
to £7.65 million in transfermarket. In both cases, if the wage the player earned in a season 
was used in the analysis, it would be highly likely to have estimated rather biased 
probabilities of winning, losing, and drawing for both Leicester City and Fenerbahce. This 
situation may be generalized to almost every professional player at some point in their career.  
There are also some secondary advantages of using transfermarkt data. First, the 
average market values are reported based on the line-up squad of the team for each match. 
Thus, we are able to exclude the squad members who are not able to make an appearance due 
to injury and low performance. Moreover, as the market values are averaged within the line-
up, we are able to remove some of the undesired bias related to a large inequality of talent 
within the squad. This is rather important in developing championships, such as the one in 
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Turkey, in which we can observe large disparities in pay within the team that results in a 
rather inflated aggregate talent level measured. 
Obviously, there are also some disadvantages of using transfermarkt data. A major 
disadvantage may be its partial dependence on opinion, therefore fan bias. However, first, 
transfermakt does not evaluate each opinion equally (the members have trust scores based on 
the post-validity of their opinions in transfer seasons), and data analysis on player 
performance is a crucial part of market values reported. Moreover, Peeters (2016) finds that 
transfermarkt data is an unbiased estimator of international soccer matches and reports that 
there is no evidence of ‘wishful thinking’ from the crowd.    
A concern about endogeneity may also be raised. Because, first, transfermarkt data 
allows for and updates the strategic measures taken by the manager or the coach for a 
particular match such as reserving important players, e.g. the ones played once championship 
is guaranteed before the league ends, the matches played against weaker teams, etc. However, 
these strategies are generally used by a coach when the championship is guaranteed or when 
it is obvious that the club would be demoted to a secondary league before the season ends. 
Thus, generally, the number of such fixtures are relatively few. Secondly, and more 
importantly, as the transfermarkt is responsive to in-field performance of individual players, 
the team probability of winning may be seen as affecting the market values of the players. 
However, first, as the individual player performance is the basis for evaluation it does not 
necessarily correlate with team performance. For instance, a large number of the players in 
Leicester City experienced a decrease in their market values even though the club performed 
spectacularly in 2015-2016 season and earned the championship for the first time in the 
Premier League. Secondly, the transfermarkt data is only updated twice a year ordinarily and 
once more in the end of the transfer-season. Thus, it only updates player data more frequently 
than the payroll data but not on a match basis. Last but not the least, as the team performance 
 
12 
as a whole is also reflected in the ability of the clubs to be able to afford high talent, it may be 
argued that the same problem may also exist in the payroll data, which is used as the primary 
data source in the literature.           
The last reason we think transfermarkt data is valid for its purpose here is, as we shall 
see later, that the estimates of essential parameters such as the one reflecting importance of 
investment/talent in high club performance (ROT)
13
 in a certain league are in line with recent 
literature such as Peeters and Szymanski (2014). Thus, even though we are unable to test for 
correlation of our data with the payroll data, we believe it is appropriate to embark on our 
analysis using transfermarkt values. He (2013) may also be consulted to see an analysis of 
the validity of market values reported by transfermarkt. 
Estimation Methodology 
Now, we start explaining our method of estimation. We use three success functions 
that admit a possibility of a draw accompanied by a simpler random choice function that we 
call the naive model. Denoting the probability assigned by the success function 𝑓 to the home 
team winning when it possesses the average market value 𝑥𝑖𝑛 and the rival possesses the 
average market value 𝑥𝑗𝑛 on match 𝑛 by 𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝑓 (∙), and the probability attached to the away 
team winning on the same match by 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝑓 (∙), and the vector of average market values in 
match 𝑛 by 𝑥𝑛 = (𝑥𝑖𝑛 , 𝑥𝑗𝑛), these three success functions and the naïve model are presented 
below. 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝐵 (𝑥𝑛) =
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼
𝑏 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 , 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝐵 (𝑥𝑛) =
𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼
𝑏 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 , (1) 
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 The name ‘decisiveness’ is coined for this parameter in contest theory as it reflects how decisive 
efforts are in the result of a contest, e.g. Hirshleifer (1991).   
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𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝐵 (𝑥𝑛) =
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼   ; 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝐽 (𝑥𝑛) =
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑐𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼   ,  𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝐽 (𝑥𝑛) =
𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼
𝜑𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 ,  
𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝐽 (𝑥𝑛) =
(𝑐2 − 1)𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼
(𝜑𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )(𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑐𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )
; 
(2) 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑌(𝑥𝑛) = (
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )
𝑘
  ,  𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑌(𝑥𝑛) = (
𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼
𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )
𝑘
,
𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑌 (𝑥𝑛) =
(𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )
𝑘
− 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼𝑘
(𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑥𝑗𝑛
𝛼 )
𝑘 ; 
(3) 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝑁 (𝑥𝑛) =
1 + 𝜑
3
 , 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝑁 (𝑥𝑛) =
1 − 𝜑
3
, 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑁 (𝑥𝑛) =
1
3
. (4) 
Expression (1) is the success function by Blavatskyy (2010), henceforth BSF, 
where 𝑏 > 0. Expression (2) is by Jia (2012), henceforth JSF, where 𝑐 > 1. And, Expression 
(3) is by Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016), henceforth VYSF, where 𝑘 > 1. The last one is 
the naive model (NF). The common parameters in each success function are 𝜑 > 0, and 𝛼 >
0. The parameter 𝜑 denotes the home-bias, i.e. the (dis)advantage possessed in probability by 
playing in the home-field, in our paper. In estimations without home-bias, we impose 𝜑 =
1.14 On the other hand, we call 𝛼 the ROT (return on talent) parameter which determines the 
sensitivity of winning to the level of talent. The distinct parameters in each success function 
are 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑘, respectively for BSF, JSF, and VYSF. These are the draw parameters in each 
model as the exclusion of each of parameter from the original function boils down to the 
success function of Tullock (1980) with dual outcome set (win and lose). As might be 
                                                 
14 𝜑 = 0 for the Naive model. Note that the parameter 𝜑 in the Naive model is not equivalent to the 
same parameter in the other success functions. We prefer to abuse the notation slightly to avoid 
confusion in the presentation of the results. 
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discerned from the functional forms, in BSF, the probability of a draw is determined by and 
negatively correlated with the level of aggregate talent/investment. On the other hand, JSF 
and VYSF use difference in talent/investment levels for attaching the probability of a draw, 
though in different manners. The former uses a linear weighting of the squared differences 
while the latter uses a polynomial weighting in differences in investment. In both success 
functions the difference in talent/investment level is negatively correlated with the probability 
of a draw. 
Denoting the vector of parameters for success function 𝑓 by Φ𝑓 
(Φ𝐵 = (𝛼, 𝜑, 𝑏),Φ𝐽 = (𝛼, 𝜑, 𝑐), Φ𝑉𝑌 = (𝛼, 𝜑, 𝑘)), the data for the average market values of 
the two teams as 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2)
𝑁, the data for home and away matches 
by 𝐻 = (ℎ1, ℎ2, . . , ℎ𝑛 , . . , ℎ𝑁) ∈ {1,2}
𝑁, and the data for the result of each match by 𝑌 =
(𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . , 𝑦𝑛, . . , 𝑦𝑁) ∈ {0,1,2}
𝑁, we define the log-likelihood function as:  
ℓ(𝑌|𝑋,𝐻,Φ𝑓) = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝕀
ℎ ∈{1,2}𝑦 ∈{0,1,2}
𝑁
𝑛=1
(𝑦 = 𝑦𝑛) 𝕀(ℎ = ℎ𝑛) log (𝑃(𝑦|𝑥𝑛, ℎ, Φ𝑓)) . (5) 
In function (5), 𝑁 is the number of observations (matches) for each league (all matches in 
data for the pooled estimations), 𝑥𝑛 = (𝑥1𝑛, 𝑥2𝑛) is the average market value of the line-up of 
the teams 1 and 2 for the match 𝑛 in thousand pounds, ℎ𝑛 ∈ {1,2} shows which team plays in 
the home field in match 𝑛, and 𝑦𝑛 = 1 (𝑦𝑛 = 2) designates that team 1 (2) won match 𝑛, and 
𝑦𝑛 = 0 shows that the match ended in a draw, 𝕀(∙) is the indicator function that takes the 
value 0 or 1 depending on whether the values of 𝑦𝑛 and ℎ𝑛 match the indexes 𝑦 ∈ {0,1,2} 
and ℎ ∈ {1,2}. The identities of the clubs are irrelevant in the specifications of the success 
functions above. Thus, it is sufficient to designate which team played as the home (away) 
team and which team lost (won) the match. Denoting 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, as the team labels (𝑖 
for the home and 𝑗 for the away team), the pointwise likelihood function for match 𝑛 is:  
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𝑃(𝑦|𝑥𝑛, ℎ, Φf) =
{
 
         𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝑓 if 𝑦 = ℎ = 𝑖,
        𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝑓 if 𝑦 = 𝑗,  ℎ = 𝑖,
𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑓 = 1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛
𝑓 − 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑛
𝑓 if 𝑦 = 0,  ℎ = 𝑖.
  
 
    (6) 
In expression (6) 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑓
 denotes the probability of a draw. The explicit form of the pointwise 
likelihood function above is given by the particular success function, 𝑓, used, i.e. by one of 
equations (1)-(4).  
For the comparison within different specifications of a success function we use the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. However, comparing results for different success functions requires 
a different test as each success function represents a non-nested model of each other, i.e. no 
success function we use can be obtained from any other by mathematical transformations. 
For this reason, we use Vuong’s (1989) closeness test for non-nested models.  
The log-likelihood values, estimations, standard errors and Vuong test results are 
calculated by a manually written code using MATLAB, which is available on demand. 
For robustness check we also employ a probit estimation by regrouping the result of 
each match. This may sound confounding at first as; first, probit also uses a maximum 
likelihood technique; and second, the probit allows for a binary outcome set only. For the 
former, it may be discerned that the success functions define a special probability function 
whose parameters can only be estimated by defining a particular log-likelihood function for 
each success function used. This is the reason we were not able to use standard statistical 
package programs in the estimations of the success functions. However, each success 
function presents a certain hypothesis about the nature of draws: BSF’s implicit hypothesis is 
that the likelihood of a draw increases as the aggregate talent on the field declines; on the 
other hand, JSF and VYSF suggest that the likelihood of a draw increases with the level of 
dissimilarity between two teams in talent on the field. These two hypotheses can be tested 
with a probit model which assumes a normally distributed binary outcome regressed over two 
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measures that represent the hypotheses suggested by individual success functions and 𝑁(0,1) 
distributed errors. For the latter, as the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive statements 
about the nature of a draw, we simply reconstruct the data by labelling each result as ‘draw’ 
and ‘no draw’, and estimate the regression coefficients (stated below in explicit form) using 
maximum-likelihood offered by standard statistical packages.  
Using the probit model as explained above, we regress the result of a match 𝑛 
(‘draw’ or ‘no draw’) on the absolute difference in average market value (𝐷𝑀𝑉𝑛), aggregate 
average market value (𝐴𝑀𝑉𝑛)
15
, and a dummy variable (𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛) that takes value 1 if the away 
team has a larger average market value than the home team, and 0 otherwise. The last 
variable is intended to crowd out the immense impact of the home-bias. Thus, the estimated 
pointwise likelihood function is: 
 Pr (𝑦𝑛 = 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤) = ξ(𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑑𝐷𝑀𝑉𝑛 + 𝛽𝑎𝐴𝑀𝑉𝑛 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛), (7) 
where 𝜉(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. This in 
turn refines the precision of our results by demonstrating whether aggregate talent or the 
difference in talent (or both) is (are) the main determinant in drawing. 
The summary statistics presented below in Table 1 do not support a singular 
hypothesis in a conclusive manner. Indeed, the MAMV (Mean Aggregate Average Market 
Value) of the teams per match declines for all leagues except for France, which shows a small 
increase, in matches that ended in a draw. On the other hand, both MDMV (Mean Difference 
                                                 
15
 Even though the difference in average market value implies a relative difference in JSF and VYSF, 
we choose to use absolute difference in probit estimation as taking the relative difference 
renders the two hypotheses mutually non-exclusive (the absolute difference is scaled with the 
aggregate investment) and taking a simple derivative of the probability of drawing in JSF and 
VYSF shows that absolute difference produces a valid hypothesis about the nature of draws.  
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in Average Market Value) and MRD (Mean Relative Difference in Average Market Value) 
show a decline for the matches that end in a draw in all leagues. Therefore, for a clearer 
inference, we use the success functions in our empirical analysis as explained above. 
Lastly, as we stated in the previous section, success functions equip us with an 
opportunity to estimate some parameters that influence the result of a soccer match 
profoundly. We call these parameters the ROT (Return on talent, 𝛼 in equations (1)-(3)), and 
home-bias (𝜑 in equations (1)-(4)). In contest theory, the former measures how sensitive the 
result is to effort level exerted by the contestants; in sports the equivalent interpretation is 
how aggregate talent is important in determining the result. Equivalent or identical 
parameters to ROT were formerly used by Szymanski (2003), Peeters (2010), Peeters and 
Szymanski (2012 and 2014) in sports economics. The latter is a general parameter in contest 
theory that measures any contestant-specific exogenous feature that increases or decreases the 
effort of a certain contestant in a multiplicative way. As the literature on soccer has 
concluded and our summary statistics in Table 2 point out, home-bias is a very influential 
parameter on the result of a match (see e.g. Clarke and Norman (1995), Carmichael and 
Thomas (2005), Koyama and Reade (2009)). Our statistics show that 46% of all the matches 
end up in home teams winning. For Italy and France, a draw is actually the second most 
likely outcome for a home team! Moreover, as we show later, our estimated parameters point 
out that moving from the away field to home field increases the probability of winning from 
at most 23% to 47% (Italy), to at least from 28% to 43% (Russia) in a match between two 
equal teams in average market value. Lastly, the measure MVA-HA% (Market Value 
Advantage versus Home Advantage) we include in Table 2 shows that the matches that end 
in a draw are more likely to be the ones where the home team does not hold the market value 
advantage. This is a clear indication that the home-bias enters in the probability of winning as 
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a multiplier of the market values as success functions (1)-(3) imply. For these reasons, we 
choose this exogenous parameter to reflect the impact of playing in the home field.      
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Table 1. Summary statistics for key variables.
16
 
League England Spain Italy Germany France Turkey Russia Aggregate 
Teams 17 17 18 17 19 17 16 121 
Gini 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.43 - 
Observations 1604 1381 1754 1707 1622 1625 1295 10987 
Draws 
408 
(25.5%) 
314 
(22.7%) 
486 
(27.7%) 
446 
(26.1%) 
489 
(30.1%) 
418 
(25.7%) 
358 
(27.6%) 
2919 
(26.6%) 
Non-Draws 
1196 
(74.5%) 
1067 
(77.3%) 
1268 
(72.3%) 
1261 
(73.9%) 
1133 
(69.9%) 
1207 
(74.3%) 
1197 
(72.4%) 
8068 
(73.4%) 
MAMV (Th. £) 
16.99 
(7.97) 
12.96 
(10.06) 
11.46 
(6.03) 
9.20 
(4.78) 
7.28 
(3.38) 
3.72 
(1.93) 
5.07 
(3.09) 
9.59 
(7.28) 
Draws 
16.15 
(7.89) 
11.46 
(9.51) 
11.02 
(6.07) 
8.66 
(4.35) 
7.30 
(3.43) 
3.55 
(1.91) 
5.00 
(3.03) 
8.99 
(6.80) 
Non-Draws 
17.27 
(7.98) 
13.41 
(10.18) 
11.63 
(6.00) 
9.39 
(4.90) 
7.27 
(3.36) 
3.77 
(1.93) 
5.09 
(3.11) 
9.81 
(7.44) 
MDMV (Th. £) 
6.48 
(4.96) 
7.02 
(7.80) 
4.81 
(3.86) 
3.30 
(3.57) 
2.44 
(2.33) 
1.48 
(1.35) 
2.29 
(2.02) 
3.96 
(4.59) 
Draws 
5.58 
(4.69) 
5.54 
(6.39) 
4.42 
(3.80) 
2.87 
(2.97) 
2.35 
(2.27) 
1.33 
(1.28) 
2.09 
(1.83) 
3.39 
(3.89) 
Non-Draws 
6.79 
(5.01) 
7.45 
(8.12) 
4.96 
(3.88) 
3.46 
(3.75) 
2.48 
(2.35) 
1.53 
(1.37) 
2.36 
(2.08) 
4.16 
(4.80) 
MRD 
0.37 
(0.22) 
0.45 
(0.26) 
0.40 
(0.24) 
0.32 
(0.21) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
0.35 
(0.23) 
0.44 
(0.23) 
0.37 
(0.27) 
Draws 
0.33 
(0.22) 
0.42 
(6.39) 
0.37 
(0.23) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
0.30 
(0.21) 
0.33 
(0.22) 
0.42 
(0.25) 
0.35 
(0.23) 
Non-Draws 
0.38 
(0.22) 
0.46 
(0.26) 
0.40 
(0.24) 
0.33 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(0.21) 
0.36 
(0.23) 
0.45 
(0.26) 
0.38 
(0.24) 
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 For every match sampled, MAMV (Mean Aggregate Average Market Value) is the average market 
value of two teams; MDMV (Mean Difference in Average Market Value), is the average market 
value difference between two teams; MRD (Mean Relative Difference), is the average market 
value difference between two teams divided by aggregate average market value of the two 
teams. Gini coefficient is calculated using the share of market values for each team. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for home bias.
17
 
League England Spain Italy Germany France Turkey Russia Aggregate 
Home W % 46% 49% 47% 45% 46% 47% 43% 46% 
Home L % 28% 28% 25% 28% 24% 27% 29% 27% 
Home D % 25% 23% 28% 26% 30% 26% 28% 27% 
MVA-HA %  49.8% 51.8% 49.9% 50.2% 51.8% 50.3% 48.9% 50.4% 
Draws 46.1% 46.2% 45.1% 45.7% 49.7% 46.7% 43.9% 46.3% 
Non-Draws 51.1% 53.6% 51.7% 51.8% 52.8% 51.5% 50.9% 51.9% 
 
Results and Discussion 
The estimation results presented in Tables (5-8) indicate that every parameter 
estimated for each success function are significant both with and without home-bias.
18
 In 
Table 3 we present an example for the estimation output for pooled data with home-bias.
 19
  
[Table 3 here] 
First of all, the likelihood ratio test indicates that the addition of the home-bias, which turns 
out to be an advantage as expected, significantly improves the fit.
20
 More importantly, 
comparison using Vuong’s closeness test in Table 4 shows that JSF and VYSF are almost 
equally appropriate for each league individually and also as a whole. In particular, the former 
                                                 
17
 MVA-HA% is the percentage of matches in which the home team also possesses the larger market 
value line-up. This measure is intended to address the multiplicative effect of the home-bias on 
individual club market values in success functions (1)-(3).    
18
 Only the estimation results (with home-bias) for the Premiere League are presented in the 
appendix. The remaining results are omitted for brevity and are available on demand. 
19
 Some data points were excluded in the pooled data due to time inconsistencies in the estimations.     
20
 As this is evident from the differences in log-likelihood between specifications (see tables (5) -
(19)), log-likelihood tests are not reported in text but provided on demand. 
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performs better for Spain, Germany, Turkey, and Russia while the latter performs better for 
England, Italy, and France and for the pooled data. However, these differences in 
performance are not significant as reported in Table 4.  
We also see that JSF and VYSF generally fit data better than BSF. The significance 
is at the level 0.01 for the pooled data, 0.05 for England, Italy, France, Turkey, and Russia, 
and at 0.10 for Spain and Germany. This result is in accordance with the argument of Peeters 
and Szymanski (2012) who discuss the inadequacy of the BSF for sports. Therefore, we may 
safely conclude that a draw is more sensitive to the difference between the talent levels of the 
two competing teams rather than the aggregate talent level in a match.  
[Table 4 here] 
The results of the probit model estimated, which conforms to our judgement above, is 
reported in Table 5. As one may observe, the coefficient of the mean aggregate average 
market value (𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑉) is not significant. Moreover, it has conflicting signs across leagues 
whereas its theoretical expected sign is negative. On the other hand, the coefficient of the 
difference in average market value between teams (𝑀𝐷𝑀𝑉) is significant (except for 
Germany and France) and negative for every championship including the pooled data. Thus, 
we confirm our expectation that difference between market value decreases the probability of 
a draw in a given match. We also observe that, if the larger average market value team is 
playing away, it is generally more likely to observe a draw as the coefficient for 𝑀𝑉𝐴 is 
significant (except for France) and positive for all championships and pooled data. This result 
shows the impact of the home bias partially offsetting the advantage of possessing a larger 
market value as implied by the success functions and our summary statistics in Table 2 
indicate.  
[Table 5 here] 
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Lastly, all success functions perform better than the NF. Even though the log-likelihood of 
the NF improves with the addition of the home-bias parameter, the improvement is surpassed 
by any of the success functions used. This shows the clear importance of average market 
values (or talent) in the performance of a soccer club.  
Next we compare certain characteristics of the leagues with VYSF as it nominally 
outperforms the other two using pooled data. We further refine the results by using estimates 
with the home-bias parameter (𝜑) due to their conclusive superiority. 
First of all, the estimated values for draw-inclination parameter, ?̂?, are in conformity 
with the particular draw characteristic of the different leagues as we present in Table 6, i.e. 
the leagues with larger draw frequency attain larger values of 𝑘. It is worth noting that the 
estimated draw-inclination parameter is surprisingly very similar to the value where the 
efforts are theoretically maximized, i.e. 𝑘 ≃ 1.44, in Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016). 
Even though this effort maximizing value is for the symmetric VYSF, estimated values 
without the home-bias also confirm this result. There is no clear explanation for this result; 
nevertheless, the theoretical conjecture is that in a completely fair league the draw-inclination 
parameter is such that the clubs would exert the largest possible investment.  
[Table 6 here] 
We also present the Gini coefficient
21
 for each league in Table 6 to see if there is a relation 
with the frequency of draws and the inequality in mean market value, which is also illustrated 
in Figures (1)-(7) per league. Note that, as we confirmed that the probability of a draw is 
determined by and negatively correlated with the difference in average market value levels, a 
                                                 
21
 Here, the Gini coefficient designates the level of inequality in average market value across teams 
sampled in a league. A larger Gini coefficient points out a larger inequality in market values. 
The Gini coefficients reported are calculated manually, aggregating all seasons for each league.  
 
23 
league that hosts a large inequality would have a lower frequency of draws. Data shows that 
the lowest frequency of draws is in Spain (22%), which also has the largest Gini coefficient 
(0.47), i.e. the maximum talent inequality. However, Russia, for which the Gini coefficient is 
0.43 presents the second largest draw frequency (28%). On the other end of the spectrum, the 
lowest Gini coefficient (0.31) coincides with the highest draw frequency (30%), which is for 
France. These results also are concordant with the maximum average market differences 
observed in overall fixtures, which is also reported in Table 6.  However, generalizing a 
result from the Gini coefficient is impossible here as it requires data from many other soccer 
leagues. Thus, we leave this as future research.  
Lastly, we discuss the estimated parameters that do not directly influence a draw, i.e. 
the ROT (𝛼) and the home-bias (𝜑). Their estimated values are reported in Table 7. We also 
report the estimated elasticities (𝜖ℎ, 𝜖𝑤) for each league of playing at home and away, 
respectively, in Table 7. Elasticity in our context is the percentage change in the probability 
of winning in response to a 1% change in investment of a team facing a rival that has the 
same level of investment. Formally, elasticity is calculated as 𝜖 =
𝑑𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗)
, at 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 
which adds up to 𝜖ℎ =
𝛼𝑘
1+𝜑
 and 𝜖𝑤 =
𝛼𝑘𝜑
1+𝜑
 for home and away field elasticities, respectively. 
The home and away field elasticities are different as VYSF changes between the two 
specifications in expression (3).  
[Table 7 here] 
Estimated values of the parameter ROT (?̂?) point out that the aggregate talent/investment 
affect the outcome the most in the English Premier League and the least in the French Ligue 
1. This result is concordant with the recent literature on soccer, e.g. Peeters and Szymanski 
(2014), especially for the Premier League. This difference makes a large impact on the 
elasticities; in the Premier League a 1% increase in average talent of a club increases the 
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probability of winning for the home team by 0.43% (0.63% for an away team) against an 
identical opponent, while in the French Ligue 1 it only makes a difference of 0.24% (0.64% 
for an away team). For away teams an increase in average market value is much more 
important as it is the only channel to overcome the home advantage of the rival.   
On the other hand, we see that the home-bias is a very decisive element in the 
outcome of a match in general. The most dominant home-bias is estimated in the Italian Serie 
A which takes the probability of winning from 23% to 47% against an equal opponent if the 
team switches from away field to home field. Whereas, we observe that the least dominant 
home-bias is in the Russian Premier Liga which still takes the same probability of winning 
from 28% to 43%.  
Last, we draw a general picture for the leagues in our data using our estimation results 
and summary statistics. The differences we observe seem to be a result of how ROT, home-
bias, and inequality in average market values interact with each other for each league. In the 
Premier League (England) and Bundesliga (Germany) the home-bias and ROT seem to be 
similar. The former parameter being relatively low (the lowest second for the Premier 
League and the lowest third for Bundesliga) and the latter parameter high in comparison to 
other leagues (the highest and the second highest, respectively). Moreover, even though 
aggregate average market value is much larger in the Premier League the inequality in 
market values is relatively low. The result is the large response in probability of winning to 
an increase in aggregate talent (0.43% in the Premier League and 0.37% in Bundesliga for 
home teams). On the other hand, Serie A (Italy) seems to possess a very high home-bias 
belittling the importance of market values partially. Ligue 1 (France) is indeed a curious case 
where the inequality among teams is the lowest, home-bias is moderate, and aggregate talent 
does not make an important difference (lowest in all leagues). This might be one of the 
reasons why we observe a large percentage of draws and often switching winners of the 
 
25 
championship in France. In Primera División (Spain) what matters seem to be the inequality 
among teams; the Gini coefficient is the largest (0.47), and draws seem to be very low in 
occurrence (22%) even though talent and home field matters moderately. This might be 
explained by so few clubs - Real Madrid and Barcelona in particular (see Figure 2) – having 
an immense market value advantage compared to their contenders and sharing the 
championship almost exclusively. The developing leagues such as Super Lig (Turkey) and 
Primer Liga (Russia) also show quite different characteristics. In Turkey, the inequality is 
moderate, home-bias is relatively low, and market values highly matter. Whereas in Russia 
we observe a large Gini coefficient (0.43), but a rather low home-bias (lowest in all leagues) 
and ROT (second lowest in all leagues) which seem to be vaguely similar to Spain where 
inequalities seem to matter the most.           
We have so far no evidence why these differences exist as these leagues are organised 
by similar market conditions and identical rules. This question remains as an issue of future 
research for the time being. Further, a dynamic use of the success functions in estimations 
may also demonstrate the long trends in these variables which has been the research issue in 
Pollard G. and Pollard R. (2005) for home-bias, even though the measure used in calculating 
the home-bias is rather different to ours in this paper.  
Conclusions 
Draws are one of the possible outcomes in various contests. In this paper, we have 
presented an empirical evaluation of the success functions that admit a possibility of a draw 
using data from the seven most valuable leagues in Europe. Moreover, we have analysed the 
difference between these major leagues in terms of some important characteristics such as 
investment inequality, home-bias and return on talent.  
Our empirical evaluation has indicated that the two success functions, i.e. the ones by 
Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016), outperform the success function by 
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Blavatskyy (2010). The main reason for the difference in performance is the contrast between 
the two groups of functional forms in their allocation of draw probability: for the former 
group, Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016), the difference in effort is the main 
determinant in the probability of a draw, whereas Blavatskyy (2010), takes the aggregate 
effort for its main determinant in probability of a draw. We have also demonstrated the 
robustness of this result with a probit estimation in which we have found that the probability 
of a draw decreases significantly with the magnitude of the difference between the market 
values of the two teams. On the other hand, the aggregate market values do not seem to affect 
the probability of a draw significantly.  
The estimated values obtained for the talent inequality, return on talent, and home-
bias for each league have shown intriguing differences among individual leagues which may 
be connected to aggregate talent levels, inequality among teams, or the level of effectiveness 
in imposing the rules of the game. These results indicate that further research is necessary in 
this area to understand the reasons for the diverging characteristics of different leagues. Our 
method also has provided an opportunity to use micro (fixture-based) data in the estimation 
of home-bias, return on talent, and other important variables that may be of interest in the 
literature on soccer.   
Obviously, our results only support the first two success functions exclusively for 
sports contests, particularly for soccer. In different contexts such as labour tournaments, rent-
seeking contests, and military conflicts results might differ from the ones obtained here. 
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the aforementioned classes of success functions are 
suitable for contest applications where the draw element is conspicuous and relevant. 
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Tables 
Table 3. Estimation results for four success functions with home-bias (Pooled Data)
 22
 
n = 10569  Pooled   
SF ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? 𝐿𝐿 
VYSF  
1.438 0.499 1.516 - - -10714 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.010)    
JSF  
1.520 0.575 - 1.895 - -10715 
(0.044) (0.044) - (0.058)   
BSF  
1.688 0.498 - - 1.777 -10886 
(0.014) (0.018) - - (0.054)  
Naive  
0.247 - - - - -11375 
(0.011) - - - -  
Table 4. Vuong Test results including home-bias
23
 
League England Spain Italy Germany France Turkey Russia Aggregate 
VYSF vs JSF 
0.797 
(0.213) 
-0.793 
(0.787) 
0.729 
(0.233) 
-0.879 
(0.810) 
1.243 
(0.107) 
-0.209 
(0.835) 
-0.145 
(0.884) 
0.417 
(0.676) 
VYSF vs. BSF 
2.180
** 
(0.015) 
1.443
*
 
(0.075) 
2.263
**
 
(0.012) 
1.328
* 
(0.092) 
2.310
**
 
(0.011) 
2.127
**
 
(0.033) 
2.188
** 
(0.029) 
8.320
***
 
(0.000) 
JSF vs. BSF 
  2.020
** 
(0.022) 
1.531
*
 
(0.063) 
  2.118
**
 
(0.017) 
1.416
* 
(0.078) 
  2.118
** 
(0.017) 
  2.141
**
 
(0.032) 
2.074
** 
(0.038) 
  8.088
*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
                                                 
22
This table reports the estimated values of the common parameters - home-bias (𝜑) and ROT (𝛼), and 
the individual parameters, 𝑘, 𝑐, and 𝑏 respectively for YSF, JSF, and BSF. Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. 
23
This table reports the Vuong’s test results of the three success functions. The numbers are Z-values 
and the numbers in the parenthesis are the p-values.  (∗∗∗), (∗∗), and (∗) shows the one-tailed 
test significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5. Probit Estimation 
League  
?̂?0 ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇 𝑀𝐷𝑀𝑉 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑉 𝑀𝑉𝐴 
England  
−0.517∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.001 0.114∗ 
(0.087) (0.008) (0.005) (0.001) 
Spain  
−0.710∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.002 0.180∗∗ 
(0.071) (0.009) (0.006) (0.075) 
Italy  
−0.547∗∗∗ −0.018∗ 0.003 0.157∗∗ 
(0.076) (0.010) (0.007) (0.064) 
Germany  
−0.573∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.008 0.150∗∗ 
(0.084) (0.015) (0.011) (0.066) 
France  
−0.595∗∗∗ −0.030 0.016 0.072 
(0.086) (0.020) (0.013) (0.065) 
Turkey  
−0.604∗∗∗ −0.061∗ −0.005 0.117∗ 
(0.081) (0.036) (0.025) (0.067) 
Russia  
−0.634∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗ 0.016 0.162∗∗ 
(0.082) (0.024) (0.015) (0.075) 
Aggregate  
−1.121∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ 0.003 0.193∗∗∗ 
(0.038) (0.008) (0.004) (0.037) 
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Table 6. Draws and market value inequalities across leagues 
24
 
League ?̂? Draw Frequency Gini Max-Diff Max-MAMV 
England  1.494 25% 0.34 22.46 46.72 
Spain  1.426 22% 0.47 35.42 70.16 
Italy  1.544 28% 0.36 17.25 32.92 
Germany  1.482 26% 0.31 21.88 37.36 
France  1.562 30% 0.31 16.68 22.88 
Turkey  1.484 26% 0.33 6.29 18.06 
Russia  1.516 28% 0.43 10.22 22.88 
Table 7. ROT, home-bias, and elasticities across leagues
25
 
League ?̂? ?̂? 𝜖ℎ̂ 𝜖?̂? 
England 0.708 1.468 0.43 0.63 
Germany 0.611 1.425 0.37 0.61 
Turkey 0.595 1.502 0.35 0.63 
Italy 0.560 1.599 0.33 0.65 
Spain 0.486 1.540 0.27 0.64 
Russia 0.424 1.334 0.28 0.60 
France 0.393 1.539 0.24 0.64 
 
                                                 
24
This table reports the estimation results of VYSF including the summary statistics concerning draws 
and market values. Draw frequency is the percentage of draws in all the matches played. Gini 
coefficient is calculated using the share of market values for each team aggregated for all 
seasons, Max-Diff is the maximum difference in market values observed among all matches, and 
Max-MAMV is the maximum aggregate market values observed among all matches. 
25
This table reports the estimation results of VYSF for the ROT (?̂?), and home-bias (?̂?) parameters 
and elasticities for home and away fields (𝜖ℎ̂, 𝜖?̂?), respectively. Standard errors may be found in 
Tables (6)-(22).  
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Table 8. Estimation results for three success functions with home-bias (1)  
n = 1604  England 
SF  ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? 𝐿𝐿 
VYSF  
1.468 0.708 1.494 - - -1567.7 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.026)    
JSF  
1.540 0.809 - 1.860 - -1568.6 
(0.056) (0.056) - (0.053)   
BSF  
1.723 0.846 - - 4.831 -1585.3 
(0.007) (0.027) - - (0.61)  
Naive  
0.242 - - - - -1726.7 
(0.028) - - - -  
Figures 
Figure 1: Mean Market Value Distribution. 
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